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In this imposing volume, Michael Witzel, Wales Professor of Sanskrit at Harvard, 
attempts to revive the study of “Comparative Mythology,” a field that never quite 
succeeded in achieving academic respectability, notwithstanding its broad appeal to 
a middlebrow public. Employing an “entirely new” historical comparative method, 
he claims results more far-reaching and reliable than any of his predecessors (74). 
This method is not historical in any conventional sense, however, as it pays little 
attention to the contexts and temporal processes relevant to individual narratives, 
texts, and traditions. Rather, the historic side of Witzel’s research is concerned to 
situate the origin of the world’s myths (and the communities responsible for them) 
in the chronology of an extremely longue durée.1
Witzel begins by telling how even in his student days, he perceived “obvious 
similarities”2 in the myths of India and Japan, an impression that grew stronger in 
1990, when he spent a full year in Japan (vi–xi). Convinced that these could not be 
explained by diffusion (as others had previously attempted; most notably, Yoshida 
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1961; 1963; 1977; 1984; Littleton 1978; 1981; 1983; 1995), nor by appeal to uni-
versal structures of the human mind (since not all world mythologies shared them), 
Witzel felt the only option was to imagine a common origin connecting the two 
cultures (1–2, 8–16, 45–47).3 This, however, would have to be set well beyond the 
temporal horizon that places India and Japan in different language families. Toward 
that end, he embarked on twenty years of reading, not only of the world’s mytholo-
gies, but also in linguistics, archeology, genetics, cave art, paleogeology, paleogeog-
raphy and other fields that probe the deep prehistory of the human species.
In spite of these admirable efforts, Witzel’s knowledge of the data beyond In-
dia (and to a lesser extent, Japan) remains understandably spotty, since mastering 
the requisite materials, languages, and cultures would take more than a lifetime. 
Inevitably, anyone who attempts to work on so large a scale relies on secondary 
sources, among which one must thus choose wisely. In some areas, however, Wit-
zel seems to have read little more than a book or two by his Harvard colleagues 
(for example, Carrasco 1982 and Sullivan 1988), or to have relied on works writ-
ten by poets, rather than ranking authorities (Graves 1955; Colum 1937). Worse 
still, when treating the myths of non-literate societies, Witzel consistently ignores 
the more recent, more reliable, and less prejudicial work of British, American, and 
French anthropologists, in favor of dated German literature steeped in the Kul-
turkreis paradigm, which used a mix of racial, cultural, and geographic factors to 
categorize the world’s peoples in ways that naturalized, legitimated, and reinforced 
the privilege of Europe’s colonial powers.4 
For his part, Witzel distinguishes two broad types of mythology, which he iden-
tifies with different geographic regions and prehistoric eras. The first type (which 
includes India and Japan, solving his initial problem) encompasses Europe, most of 
Asia, the Americas, and Polynesia in a group he terms “Laurasian.” Here, in Witzel’s 
view, a mythic system took shape before humans crossed the Bering Straits, circa 
20,000 years bp. The defining feature of this system—indeed, that which made it a 
system—was that it organized a sequence of (potentially separable) themes and epi-
sodes into a coherent story line, beginning with creation from nothing and ending 
with cosmic destruction. In his reconstruction, the system included these elements. 
Creation from nothing, chaos etc. Father Heaven/Mother earth created
Four (five) generations/ages: Heaven pushed up, sun released
Current gods defeat/kill predecessors; killing the dragon, use of sacred 
drink
Humans: somatic descendants of (sun) god; they (or a god) show hubris 
and are punished by a flood
Trickster deities bring culture; humans spread, (emergence of “nobles”)
Local history begins
Final destruction of the world
New heaven and earth emerge (183)
In contrast, Witzel places the rest of the world—sub-Saharan Africa, Australia, 
Melanesia, and parts of south Asia—in a second category that he construes as Lau-
rasia’s “antipode” (339). This area he names “Gondwanaland,”5 a territory whose 
inhabitants did not assemble their myths in a unified story line. Showing little inter-
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est in primordial creation or apocalyptic cataclysm, they detailed the emergence of 
ancestral beings, whose adventures and foundational acts they narrated episodically. 
According to Witzel’s reconstruction, Gondwana mythology included the following: 
In the beginning: heaven and earth (and the sea) already exist
A High God lives in heaven, or on earth, or ascends to heaven later
Series of lower gods, often children of High God, act as tricksters and cul-
ture heroes
Primordial people ended by some evil deed of son of High God (or by 
humans)
Humans are created from trees and clay (or rock); occasionally, descend 
directly from the gods/totem ancestors
Humans act haughtily or make a mistake; punishment by a great flood; 
humans reemerge in various ways
(An end to the world is missing) (323)
Although “Gondwana” myths can include some “Laurasian” themes (the flood, 
for instance, or the separation of heaven and earth), Witzel accounts for such over-
lap in one of two ways. Either it is the result of late diffusion from Laurasia to 
Gondwanaland (the kind of argument theorists of the Kulturkreislehre consistently 
made in such circumstances)6 or the residue of a “Pan-Gaean” stratum, which he 
dates 65,000 years bp, when Homo sapiens had not yet dispersed from Africa. What 
definitively and categorically differentiates the two systems is not specific narratives 
or their details: 
The main feature, the story line approach, cannot and must not be aban-
doned; it is central to the theory.… Even a certain accumulation of cir-
cumstantial counterevidence does not suffice to bring down the theory: for 
example, if someone were to show that certain individual items (diver, flood 
myth) are in fact also found in sub-Saharan Africa or in Papua/Australia, I 
would not concede: the main pillar of the Laurasian theory, the story line 
arrangement, and myths of primordial creation and impending destruction, 
would still stand (283; see also 54, 101, 281, 321, and 329). 
The two systems are thus distinguished by the overarching story line that organ-
izes other episodes inside its account of cosmic beginning and end, creating what 
Witzel refers to as “our first novel” (see the title to chapter 3: “Creation Myths: the 
Laurasian Story Line, Our First Novel”). It is this that “Laurasians” (putatively) 
have and “Gondwanalanders” (putatively) lack, much as Naturvölker were said to 
have no myths of creation by theorists of the Kulturkreislehre, since speculative 
thought of this sort was restricted to Hochkulturen.7 In similar fashion, Witzel con-
trasts—and implicitly ranks—two kinds of people, those who theorize, systematize, 
and think big vs. those who do not: Laurasia vs. Gondwanaland; north vs. south; 
high cultures vs. low; us vs. them.8 It is a familiar and a troubling construct. 
Let me make clear that I do not take Witzel himself to be racist. Rather, I believe 
he has written a seriously flawed book whose conclusions carry racist implications. 
However unintentional this may be, his uncritical reliance on tainted scholarship 
of the Kulturkreislehre facilitated this result, as did the methods he employed. For 
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when one organizes complex and variegated phenomena into large categories set 
in binary opposition, the contrast one draws is always discriminatory. And when 
one seeks to “reconstruct” a deep past, the paucity of direct evidence provides a 
relatively blank screen onto which one is free to project all manner of fantasies, 
prejudices, and delusions. 
Correcting Witzel’s errors begins with the recognition that it is impossible to 
survey all the world’s myths, as most of the stories actually told have gone unre-
corded. At best, one can survey what has been published, but then one must ask how 
these came to be collected, organized, and committed to writing. Sometimes textual-
ization came at a moment when literacy was just beginning to gain traction and was 
accomplished by a group’s own intellectuals, who selected among the many narratives 
in oral circulation and assembled these in a more ambitious, more comprehensive 
metanarrative that often (but not always) deployed creation as an opening device 
and apocalypse for closure. Such processes can be observed as late as the nineteenth 
century, when Elias Lönnrott confected the Kalevala in much the same way Snorri 
Sturluson produced the Edda, Hesiod put together the Theogony, and unnamed oth-
ers produced the Popol Vuh, Kojiki, and Hebrew Bible. The “story line approach” 
that Witzel considers the defining characteristic of “Laurasia” is not, in fact, present 
in the vast majority of myths recounted in Europe, Asia, Oceania, the Americas, or 
anywhere else in the world. Rather, it is the way an extremely small number of textu-
alizers shaped a handful of works that subsequently acquired canonic status. 
Similarly, what Witzel makes characteristic of “Gondwana” is the style of textual-
ization employed by visiting scholars (including also missionaries and colonial au-
thorities who function as such) when they collect, translate, and publish stories told 
by the “others” they engage in their professional capacity. Conceivably, such people 
might regard individual stories as parts of a coherent whole, whose nature is taken 
for granted by locals and normally left tacit. Knowledgeable nonnative scholars could 
surely identify unifying themes, render these explicit, and supply connective tissue 
as necessary, including an introduction and conclusion. In doing so, they would 
fabricate a coherent metanarrative of the sort produced by indigenous textualizers. 
Normally, however, an ethic of fidelity to the oral nature of the materials they gather 
obliges them to reproduce individual narratives much as they heard them, while 
confining their own interpretive or amplifying remarks to separate sections of their 
publications (introduction, footnotes, commentary, and so on). Exogenous textu-
alizers thus produce books resembling anthologies of collectively-authored short 
stories, rather than novels: “Mythology of the Maori,” “Nuer Myths,” and the like. 
If one takes the claims embedded in such titles too seriously, while mischaracteriz-
ing the extraordinary syntheses of Hesiod, Snorri, & Co. in parallel fashion (“Greek 
Myth,” “Norse Mythology,” and so on), it is easy to develop a theory whereby 
different cultural styles find expression in two distinctive forms of mythic narra-
tion. Alternatively, one might recognize that different scholarly styles produce two 
distinctive kinds of texts, one that integrates its content via a frame story, the other 
via an author’s introduction. The contrast is not between “Laurasian” and “Gond-
wana” mythologies, but between indigenous and exogenous agents, processes, and 
products of textualization. At a few points, Witzel entertains something like that 
reviews | 447
idea (see pages 98–103), although he rejects it quickly and continues to theorize in 
terms of deep prehistory, waves of migration, patterns of diffusion, and contrasts be-
tween the styles of thought/narration he associates with two huge aggregates of the 
world’s population. Some may find that attractive, but it strikes me as ill-founded, 
ill-conceived, unconvincing, and deeply disturbing in its implications. 
Notes
1. Describing this method, Witzel states: “The historical comparative approach is not 
one of old-fashioned Romanticism looking for and speculating on distant ur-situations, 
but it is the cladistic procedure also used by genetics, human anthropology, archaeology, 
linguistics, and philological manuscript research” (46). Regrettably, Witzel misleads him-
self and his reader in drawing this overstated contrast. Rather than rejecting the Romantic 
option in favor of reliable science (as he no doubt sincerely believes), he operates largely 
within the former, however much he decks it out with superficial trappings of the latter.
2. This phrase echoes through the book (for example, see pages 18, 50, 53, 75) and 
should not be left unexamined. Its goal is to obscure agency (and the possibility of error) 
by inverting the relations of subject and object, making it seem that these “similarities” 
are present in the data themselves and force themselves on the reader, rather than being 
a perception readers construct on the basis of their prior knowledge and expectations 
(which may well be misleading).
3. See the book under review, pages 1–2, 8–16, and 45–47. At least three other possi-
bilities go unconsidered: (1) the resemblances result from polygenesis and are sufficiently 
broad and general as to constitute cliches of a sort that demand little explanation; (2) the 
resemblances are mirages experienced by scholars who overvalue their significance vis-à-
vis the differences that divide the myths and cultures in question; (3) the myths in ques-
tion frame similar responses to similar phenomena (natural and/or social).
4. Scholars who worked within this paradigm identified with many disci-
plines (Ethnologie, Anthropologie, Volkskunde, Völkerkunde, Rassenkunde, and 
Rassenwissenschaft), but shared a large number of assumptions no longer intellectually 
or morally tenable. More important than differences in disciplinary orientation was the 
distinction between Germans and Austrians, the latter of whom tended to be missionaries 
and whose racism could be softer (condescension, rather than contempt). Equally impor-
tant is the difference between works written prior to 1920, whose subtexts justified colo-
nial expansion and domination, and those written after 1930, which were strongly inflected 
by Nazi ideology. Works of the 1920s either continued the former trend or anticipated the 
later, and sometimes both. Witzel relies on a great many works written by scholars of 
this sort, not just for data, but for many important lines of interpretation. Those he cites 
directly include Adolf Bastian, Hermann Baumann, Fritz Bornemann, Erich Brauer, Ernst 
Dammann, Otto Dempwolf, Hans Findeisen, Leo Frobenius, Martin Gusinde, Beatrix 
Heintze, Hermann Hochegger, Adolf Jensen, Karl Jettmar, Walter Lehmann, Roberto 
Lehmann-Nitsche, Johannes Maringer, Hans Nevermann, Alois Pache, Heinz Reschke, 
Hans Schärer, Paul Schebesta, Wilhelm Schmidt, August Schmitz, Carl Leonhard 
Schultze-Jena, Wilhelm Staudacher, Paul Wirz, and Josef Dominik Wölfel. There is now 
a large critical literature on scholarship of this sort, including Gothsch (1983); Marx 
(1988); Fischer (1990); Linimayr (1994); Jacobeit et al. (1994); Hauschild ed. 
(1995); Streck ed. (2000); and Evans (2010). 
5. The names Witzel assigns these regions and peoples were introduced by pioneer-
ing geologists who first worked out theories of continental drift. “Gondwanaland” is the 
coinage of Suess (1885), and “Laurasia” of Staub (1928). 
6. For an example, see Staudacher (1942), a work that deeply influenced Witzel’s 
views. Having shown the broad attestation of myths in which Father Heaven and Mother 
Earth have to be forcibly separated in order to open up the space in which human life could 
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develop, Staudaucher defended the dignity of the “cultural and racial community” he con-
sidered responsible for the development of such a narrative. Following lines developed by 
earlier Kulturkreise theoreticians (Leo Frobenius, Hermann Baumann, Fritz Graebner, and 
Wilhelm Mühlmann), he posited multiple lines of diffusion whereby this sophisticated story 
reached the Naturvölker of sub-Saharan Africa, Polynesia, Australia, and the Americas. 
7. Rather incredibly, Witzel cites one testimony of this sort as a confirmatory anteced-
ent of his own position. On page 316, he writes:
Central African mythology is characterized as not interested in creation myths. This 
feature has been stated by scholars who could not yet know of the present theory. In 
the summary of his book, Baumann formulates in general and rather stark terms: 
[These myths] are indeed much less colorful… They lack the speculation of 
nature philosophy of the Polynesians and some Amerindians, the close intertwin-
ing of human fate with the astral word [sic] as found with the Amerindians, and the 
grotesque fantasy of the Eskimos. The center of African myth is occupied by a cre-
ation principle that in most cases is identical with the High God, and the First Man, 
who has been begat, formed or brought forth by him. How this first man came to 
earth, how he lived and what he experienced is the topic of almost all African mythol-
ogy. Next to this, the myths are almost insignificant of the emergence of heaven 
and earth, of the stars, and of supernatural beings that occupy a large portion of the 
mythology of other continents” (emphasis and ellipsis in the original).
The passage cited is taken from Baumann (1936, 1), a work written by a learned schol-
ar and committed Nazi, whose research in Africa was meant to justify German coloniza-
tion of inferior peoples. He is, moreover, one of the authors on whom Witzel relied most 
heavily, with more than a hundred citations; on his life and work, see Braun (1995).
8. Given Witzel’s repeated swipes at scholarship he dismisses as “fashionable,” one 
is tempted to add another register to the system of oppositions: scholars who still value 
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